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We study accounting choice around firm-level collective agreement negotiations. Prior 
literature argues that managers make income-decreasing accounting choices to limit the 
concessions made to trade unions. However, empirical research to date fails to find 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. We expect that this lack of evidence is driven by 
the confounding effects of (i) methodological concerns and (ii) influential institutional 
factors. Using a sample of US firms that engage in firm-level labor bargaining during the 
period 1994-2007, we study whether managers act strategically in an attempt to reduce 
the proportion of firm wealth that is accrued to employees. Our findings suggest that 
managers take real rather than accounting actions to minimize payments. In particular, 
we find evidence consistent with (i) managerial strategic timing of the negotiation, and 
with (ii) increased conditional conservatism in the year of labor bargaining. We do not 
find evidence of earnings manipulation. This potentially signals that accounting choice 
around labor negotiations is informative rather than opportunistic. 
Keywords: accounting choice, earnings quality, collective bargaining.  
JEL Classifcation: M41, J30, J51 
 
Resumen 
En el presente trabajo se estudia la elección de políticas contables en torno a la 
negociación de convenios colectivos. La literatura previa predice que los gerentes tratan 
de reducir el resultado contable para minimizar las concesiones realizadas a los 
sindicatos. Sin embargo, no hay evidencia empírica clara hasta la fecha que ratifique esta 
hipótesis. Esperamos que esta falta de evidencia se justifique por (i) problemas 
metodológicos de estudios previos, y (ii) la influencia de factores institucionales. 
Empleando una muestra de empresas de EEUU que negocian un convenio colectivo 
entre 1994 y 2007, se estudia si los gerentes actúan estratégicamente para reducir el 
porcentaje de renta empresarial que se transfiere a los trabajadores. Nuestros resultados 
sugieren que los gerentes se valen de decisiones operativas en lugar de contables para 
minimizar los pagos a empleados. En particular, encontramos evidencia de (i) elección 
estratégica de cuándo negociar, y (ii) mayor conservadurismo contable en el año del 
evento. No encontramos evidencia de gestión oportunista del resultado, lo que 
potencialmente indica que las decisiones contables en torno a la negociación colectiva 
son informativas. 
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1.   Introduction 
We study if firms make use of their discretion to minimize the percentage of 
corporate rents accrued to employees. In particular, we depart from prior literature and 
separately study whether managers make use of the flexibility inherent to accrual 
calculations to artificially depress earnings before labor negotiations, or alternatively, 
they strategically time collective bargaining so that negotiations take place in periods 
when firm performance and outlook are worse. 
It is widely accepted that publicly held firms are increasingly characterized by 
the existence of private benefits of control. Institutional investors, managers or large 
shareholders can extract firm rents at the expense of other parties such as employees or 
minority shareholders (Dyck and Zingales 2004). Against this backdrop, firm-level 
collective agreement negotiation potentially leads to a redistribution of firm wealth, 
limiting the ability of controlling parties to extract private benefits. As a result, firms are 
predicted to act strategically to improve their bargaining position with labor, by for 
example, holding less cash to shelter corporate income from the demands of unions. 
Recent work by Klasa et al. (2009) argues that by holding less liquid assets, firms can 
gain concessions from employees, as they can credibly make the case that the risk of 
liquidity shortages threatens the firm competitive viability. However, this strategy may 
prove harmful if the firm ends up facing liquidity constraints.  
  A potentially less costly alternative is to directly reduce income, by utilizing the 
flexibility inherent to accounting accruals calculation. During contract negotiations, the 
different parties use financial statements information data to inform their demands and 
expectations and to predict firm viability, growth and wealth over the collective 
agreement horizon. Particularly, they use accounting earnings as a major input (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986, DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991). However, accounting earnings 
need not always map into economic earnings. A large stream of research demonstrates 
that conflicts of interests, coupled with the prevalence of information asymmetries, 
result in the emergence of incentives to manage accounting numbers to conceal true 
economic performance (Healy and Wahlen 1999, Dechow and Skinner 2000).
1 
Prior work on accounting choice surrounding labor negotiations presents 
inconclusive evidence and mixed theories. In their seminal work, Watts and 
                                                 
1 Both the FASB and the IASB recognise that employees and their representatives are external users of 
financial information (IASB 1989, FASB 1978).   5
Zimmerman (1986) argue that managers make income-decreasing accounting choices to 
reduce firm visibility and political costs. This leads to the general prediction that 
managers decrease earnings prior to collective agreement negotiations to minimize 
payments to employees. However, the empirical evidence to date is generally 
inconclusive and appears to be sensitive to the research method employed, as well as to 
the structure of the labor market, i.e., the unit of negotiation or the strength of trade 
unions. Early work by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) finds evidence that unionized 
firms artificially deflate earnings prior to negotiations, whilst Liberty and Zimmerman 
(1986) fail to document income-decreasing manipulations when using a different 
method to estimate accounting discretion. More recently, using discretionary accruals 
models, Mora and Sabater (2008) find evidence of income-decreasing activity in a 
continental European setting. They argue that it is the ‘open shop’ negotiation system, 
jointly with these countries’ institutional characteristics (historically more favorable to 
unionizing and employee rights movements) that creates incentives to manipulate 
earnings downwards prior to firm-level negotiations.  
To shed light on the relative importance of research methods and institutional 
backgrounds in driving the results of prior literature, we identify a sample of US firms 
that sign firm-level collective agreements in the period 1994-2007, and study strategic 
accounting choice around labor contracts by benchmarking our results against a 
matched control group. We focus on US, a country where the labor union movement has 
achieved relatively low power (Mathias and Davis 1996), as exemplifying an 
environment with institutional factors that make the income-decreasing hypothesis less 
plausible. Using these data, we run two set of tests. First, we look at the timing of the 
collective agreement negotiation (the ‘event’). If wealth is redistributed amongst the 
parties due to labor negotiations, then, these negotiations could be seen as analogous to 
exercising an option. Managers probably have discretion as to the period of negotiation 
and likely consider the net benefits for multiple future periods during their decision. It is 
expected that managers can estimate the net benefits of negotiating with employees in 
any given year and develop a preference concerning when to negotiate. Managers likely 
decide whether to negotiate in period t or to wait based on these estimated net benefits. 
We test this hypothesis using an event history model similar to the work of 
Reppenhagen (2010).  
The results from this test confirm the hypothesis that managers time their 
decision to negotiate with employees. In particular, we show negotiations take place 
when firm profitability and liquidity are low. This is consistent and complements the 
evidence in Klasa et al. (2009) on the association between industry unionizing and cash   6
holdings. Our evidence is also consistent with the relative strength of the different 
parties being important in determining when labor negotiations take place. We show 
that collective agreement negotiation is positively related to the relative power of the 
employee base.  
In a second set of tests, we study accounting choice around negotiations. We 
measure accounting choice in two related ways. First we look at abnormal accrual and 
cash flow behavior around the event, using (i) abnormal accruals as calculated by the 
Jones (1991) model and its extensions, and (ii) abnormal cash flows as calculated by the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model. Second, we study conditional accounting conservatism 
(i.e., timely loss recognition) around the event using the asymmetric persistence model 
proposed by Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The joint use of these 
related but separate methods allows us to disentangle opportunistic from informative 
accounting decisions, i.e., to detect whether income-decreasing choices are associated to 
the existence of bad news about the firm or respond simply to strategic attempts to 
reduce employees’ share in firm rents. The results from this second test are generally 
consistent with a depression of reported income around labor negotiations that appears 
to be informative rather than opportunistic. The evidence from the earnings 
management tests is weak and does not support the hypotheses of opportunistic income 
depression. The results obtained from the conservatism tests suggest that conditional 
conservatism increases around collective agreement bargaining. This indicates that 
reductions in reported income surrounding contract negotiations are associated to a 
more timely recognition of bad news.   
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of accounting choice. In their review of the literature, 
Fields et al. (2001) call for further research on the determinants and consequences of 
accounting choice. We study an under-researched area: the incentives for and 
determinants of income-decreasing accounting choice. There is little prior evidence on 
this area and even less recent work on the potential consequences of accounting choice 
on employee wealth. As we mentioned previously, prior evidence is scarce and presents 
conflicting results (and theories). We also add to prior work by using a method that 
permits shedding light on the previously described confounding effects affecting the 
early studies. In particular, by using conditional conservatism models, we can better 
analyze if income decreasing accounting choices are driven by opportunistic or 
informative (signaling) motivations. Put together, our results are consistent with the 
industry-level results of Klasa et al. (2009), but suggest that managers time the decision 
to negotiate when profitability is low, rather than artificially deflate earnings before   7
negotiating. Finally, by studying firm-level labor negotiations in the US, we can analyze 
whether employee strength is a significant driver of accounting choice to avoid a 
transfer of wealth to the workers. We thus contribute to the understanding of results in 
prior literature and at the same time to point out the role of differences in institutional 
factors between countries with diverse quality of earnings.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the prior 
literature and presents the hypotheses, as well as describes the institutional 
characteristics of collective agreements in US. Section 3 presents the research design 
and describes the sample. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper, and finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
2.   Literature review and predictions 
Prior literature proposes two theoretical approaches to the study of the 
association between managerial accounting choices and labor considerations: (i) the 
‘ability-to-pay’ theory that was tested by the early studies, and (ii) the more recent 
‘attract-and-retain’ theory. 
Broadly, the first perspective assumes that through labor negotiations employees 
can reduce the part of firm rents accrued to other parties. Because earnings are a key 
item to evaluate firm future outlook and profitability, the greater accounting earnings 
are, the greater the demands from trade unions and employees. In this setting, the onset 
of employee bargaining creates incentives to artificially deflate accounting earnings 
thereby lowering the firm perceived ability to pay high(er) wages, and thus, constraining 
employees’ demands. This hypothesis links directly with the influential ‘political cost’ 
hypothesis in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) positive accounting theory. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) predict that managers reduce accounting earnings to reduce firm 
visibility. Large, profitable firms draw the attention of interested parties such as the 
press, politicians or employees. This attention, in turn, may lead to governmental 
intervention (by for example, imposing new regulations or caps on prices) or more to 
the point of our research, to greater concessions to employees during collective 
agreement negotiations. 
Early work on this hypothesis by Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) argues that 
union members presumably do not completely adjust reported earnings for expected 
manipulations because such adjustments are costly and thus, thanks to income-
decreasing manipulation, a lower transfer of wealth to the employees may be agreed   8
upon. They analyze expense accruals in the period immediately preceding union wage 
bargaining but fail to find results in support of their hypothesis. They suggest that this 
failure may be due to economy-wide recession in the period, or to managerial beliefs 
that unions can see through the manipulation and adjust earnings accordingly, rendering 
manipulation meaningless. As an additional explanation to their (lack of) results, 
Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) indicate that it is likely that the method employed to 
proxy for income-decreasing manipulation is incapable of measuring it without error.  
Subsequent work by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) and Mautz and 
Richardson (1992) finds only weak evidence of patterns in expenses being associated to 
the timing of labor negotiations. In a slightly different setting, later studies, such as 
Scott (1994) or Cullinan and Knobett (1994) also find only weak evidence of an 
association between labor union intensity and accounting strategies. The more recent 
study of Cullinan and Bline (2003) fails to find evidence of an association between 
labor considerations and the choice of depreciation policies in Canada. Cullinan and 
Bline (2003) argue that the general lack of evidence in this line of research is due to 
labor negotiations being infrequent, and thus, other common incentives for income-
increasing manipulation overriding the income-decreasing motives. In line with this 
argument, extant literature demonstrates that managers face income-increasing 
incentives derived from compensation and debt contracts, or to meet simple accounting 
targets, such as beating analysts’ forecasts or prior period earnings (Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997, Degeorge et al. 1999). 
Looking at real choices, Klasa et al. (2009) analyze if more unionized industries 
strategically hold less cash to gain concessions from employees. Klasa et al. (2009) 
argue that by strategically holding less liquid assets firms can credibly make the case 
that the risk of liquidity shortages threatens the firm competitive viability. This study is 
one of the few that has found evidence in support of strategic decision making around 
labor negotiations, although their evidence refers to real actions rather than accounting 
choices.  
With regards to the alternative ‘attract-and-retain’ hypothesis, it is argued that in 
certain settings managers choose income-maximizing accounting policies to reassure 
their employees of firm financial strength (Bowen et al. 1995, Cullinan and Bline 2003). 
This hypothesis clearly applies to settings where it is possible to differentiate amongst 
classes of workers, as well as in settings (industries or firms) characterized by the 
presence of highly qualified, difficult to replace workers. Salaries are commonly 
negotiated directly with individuals, instead of via the signature of a collective   9
agreement. In the absence of collective negotiations, the incentives to reduce corporate 
income are attenuated, as (i) employees are unlikely to have sufficient power to 
individually demand increases in salary or other benefits; (ii) each individual contract 
represents an insignificant proportion of total firm wealth, and (iii) there is no single 
event when all or most contracts are negotiated at once. This is particularly the case in 
US, where the signature of a collective agreement only applies to unionized workers. 
Under these circumstances, labor negotiation, even if it results in increases in salaries, 
may not represent an event that creates sufficient incentives to override the more 
generally prevailing income-increasing motivations.  
Hence, institutional factors are expected to be a significant driver of accounting 
choice around labor negotiations and may partly explain the inconsistency of results 
reported by prior work on this area. Work by Harris et al. (1994) and García Lara et al. 
(2005), while not directly testing their predictions, argues that income-decreasing 
practices in countries like Germany are partially motivated by the strength of labor 
unions. In addition, prior research by Leuz et al. (2003) or Ball et al. (2003) 
demonstrates that institutional factors significantly drive cross-country differences in 
accounting quality (and choices). In the next section, we discuss in more detail the 
institutional background of collective agreement negotiation. 
2.1.   Collective agreement negotiations: institutional background  
The relationships between managers and workers, companies and employees or 
capitalists and proletarians are considered central to the modern process of economic 
growth. Different countries and economies have experienced different patterns of 
growth and followed different paths to establish modern economics, resulting in 
differing labor organization systems (Mathias and Davis 1996). In fact, nowadays, both 
the coverage rate of collective bargaining and the legal rules that mandate labor 
negotiations vary across countries. 
Generally, collective bargaining can be organized under an ‘open-shop’ or a 
‘close-shop’ rule. In the ‘close-shop’ system common in Anglo-Saxon countries, only 
unionized workers are affected by contract agreements. In these systems, labor 
negotiations are structured in a single level of bargaining: at the firm-level, and it is 
common for individual employees to negotiate their salaries and work conditions 
independently of other workers. One of the main differences between these systems is 
that in a ‘close-shop’ system the concessions and conditions agreed upon in the 
bargaining process only apply to unionized workers. This reduces the overall effect on   10
company earnings of an increase in wages. Thus, it is less likely that managers attempt 
to artificially depress earnings in firms operating in ‘close-shop’ systems, as the net 
benefits of such an action are unclear, particularly in the presence of overriding 
motivations to meet earnings targets or avoid debt-covenant violations.
2  
As previously mentioned, because of the potentially confounding effects that 
could cause the lack of empirical support for the income-decreasing hypothesis 
proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), we focus on US firms. In general terms, the 
US system of collective bargaining fits with the outline of the Anglo-Saxon ‘close-shop’ 
model of collective bargaining, where collective bargaining can only cover agreements 
at the firm level. This generally leads to lower levels of unionizing. For example, 
according to the Bureau of Labor (2009), the percentage of unionized workers in the US 
is relatively low (10-15%), and the coverage of collective bargaining is around 14%. 
Likely, the incidence of formal firm-level bargaining is lower than the incidence of 
individual salary and working conditions negotiations, as only about 14% of employees 
are covered by firm-level collective agreement.  
Firm-level collective agreements have a limited life. Their conditions can be 
renegotiated. It is rare for the workers to exert pressure to renegotiate the agreement 
because they cannot call for strikes in support of their demands, as strikes are held only 
by referendum.. This (re)negotiation of the conditions may last several months (and 
span different years), during which time the company gives the workers relevant 
information on current and future performance. To start negotiations both parties must 
be informed to plan their strategies and time their actions. The very fact that a firm signs 
a collective agreement signals the strength of its employee base as a pressure group, 
particularly in a country such as the US, where traditionally, trade unions are not as well 
organized or powerful as in other countries like France or Germany. To the extent that 
this process reduces the share of managers, debt-holders, shareholders and other parties 
in the firm’s wealth, it is expected that managers may intercede in the bargaining 
process to lower the percentage of firm’s rents that are distributed to the employees. We 
test two interlinked hypothesis, the first one related to the timing of the bargaining 
process: 
                                                 
2 . In ‘open-shop’ systems, labor agreements and concessions are extended to all workers, independently 
of their union status. Collective bargaining is often structured in multiple levels of negotiation, at the 
national-, industry- and firm- levels. Firm-level agreements cannot contradict the terms of higher-level 
agreements. Industry agreements establish a second layer of minimum wages (above the national 
statutory minimum) which can only be revised downwards by firm-level agreements under special 
circumstances. Hence, a salary increment agreed at the firm-level is almost always inevitably higher than 
the industry- and nation- level agreements.    11
H1: Managers strategically time collective agreement negotiations to limit the 
transfer of wealth to employees. 
During contract negotiations, workers may have limited access to private 
information, but commonly, the information used to inform their demands and 
expectations comes mainly from the (prior) annual and (current) quarterly financial 
statements published by the company. Based on the previously discussed theories and 
evidence, we formulate a second hypothesis related to accounting choice around 
contract negotiations: 
H2: Managers make strategic accounting choices to reduce corporate income 
before collective agreement negotiations thereby limiting the transfer of wealth to the 
employees.  
3.   Method and sample 
We study managerial strategic actions around firm-level bargaining with 
employees (in the form of collective agreements). In our empirical tests, we run two set 
of analyses. First, we model the timing of firm collective agreement negotiations. 
Second, we study the relationship between labor bargaining in a given year (the event, 
henceforth) and accounting quality in the years that surround this event. If firm 
stakeholders are reluctant to share firm wealth with employees, on aggregate, we should 
observe (i) a strategic timing of the collective agreement negotiation; and (ii) lower 
(abnormal) earnings and delayed economic gains recognition before the event, to 
minimize the wealth transferred to employees. 
3.1.   Collective agreement negotiations timing 
In our first set of tests, we study the timing of the signature of the agreement 
using an event history model designed for diffusion processes following Reppenhagen 
(2010) Event history analysis is used to illuminate the process leading to the occurrence 
of an event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997), in contrast to traditional binary 
regression techniques (e.g. logistic, probit) that focuses only on the event itself (LeClere 
2000). In addition, binary regression cannot handle the heterogeneous timing dimension 
of labor negotiation decisions without bias whereas event history models excel in that 
area. Specifically, we estimate the following event history model relating the signature 
of a collective agreement to a set of corporate variables, firm visibility, performance, 
and a vector of dummy variables that control for industry membership:   12
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where CollAgr takes the value of 1 if firm i signs a collective agreement in year t 
(eventit = 1) and 0 otherwise (eventit = 0); CEOInf is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board of directors, 0 
otherwise; Lev is financial leverage calculated as the value of total debt to total assets. 
We define CEOInf and Lev so that greater values of these variables are associated to 
more power from stakeholders other than employees. We expect that the greater the 
power of other stakeholders vis-à-vis employees, the more likely it is that the agreement 
will be strategically timed. 
As additional variables in model (1) we incorporate ROA,  Cash,  Nemp and 
Visibility. ROA is the return on assets measured as the ratio of net income to total assets; 
Nemp is the natural logarithm of the number of employees; MKTB is the market-to-book 
ratio; Cash is cash and cash equivalents divided by beginning-of-period total assets; and 
Visibility is a vector of variables that measures firm visibility. Specifically, we consider 
a)  SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of firm assets; b) Leader, an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the ratio of annual changes in firm sales to industry 
change in sales is in the top quartile of the annual distribution, 0 otherwise; and c) 
Perform, a variable measuring prior firm performance that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has had positive increases in earnings in each of the past two years, 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we incorporate industry dummies (IND) in the model.  
If managers time their decision to negotiate with workers to reduce the share of 
employees in firm rents, it is expected that they will bargain in periods with low ROA 
and  Cash, and will be less likely to negotiate after periods of consecutive growth 
(Perform=1), to minimize payments to employees. On the contrary, they may be obliged 
to negotiate when the employee base is greater, or they hold a position of leadership in 
their industry (visibility is high). 
It is important to note in model (1) the difference between calendar time and 
time in the study. Firms enter the study continuously throughout the sample period (that 
spans the period 1994-2007). Some firms are censored (the non-event firms) while 
others experience the event (the firms that sign a collective agreement). In calendar 
time, both the entry and the exit time of the firms are staggered and can occur at any   13
time throughout the sample period. In some cases, firms may experience more than one 
event (if they sign more than one agreement).  
3.2.   Accounting choice surrounding collective agreement negotiations 
An alternative to timing the decision to negotiate with employees when 
corporate performance is low is to directly reduce corporate income prior to labor 
negotiations. Managers can reduce employees’ share in firm profits by reducing 
earnings. We study if this is the case using two set of tests. First, we look at the 
evolution of firm abnormal accounting accruals in the years surrounding labor 
bargaining. If earnings are artificially depressed in the years leading up to the event, we 
should observe lower abnormal accruals in the years prior to the signature, and greater 
abnormal accruals after the event, when prior years’ abnormal accruals reverse.  
Second, we study the level of conditional accounting conservatism around the 
event. Conditional conservatism is the consequence of the asymmetric verifiability 
requirements for the recognition of gains and losses that results in earnings that reflect 
bad news (losses) in a timelier fashion that good news (gains). This property of earnings 
is referred to as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (Basu 1997) or conditional 
conservatism (Beaver and Ryan 2005). We study if managers are more likely to delay 
the recognition of gains and more likely to timely recognize losses, thereby increasing 
conditional conservatism (and lowering earnings, in this case, for informative purposes) 
around the signature of a collective agreement with employees. 
By using these two methodologies in combination we can determine whether 
any evidence of income-decreasing activity is driven by opportunistic incentives to 
reduce employees’ share in firm rents, or responds to actual economic events (bad 
news) surrounding labor negotiation as indicated by the conditional conservatism tests.  
3.2.1. Earnings management tests 
The literature essentially distinguishes two accounting mechanisms used to 
manage earnings: (i) changes in accounting method; and (ii) timing the allocation of 
revenues and expenses. The first mechanism is clearly more visible. It is unlikely that 
managers change procedures during contract talks since this manipulation is easily 
observed, and the repeated game nature of labor contracts would necessitate switching 
back to the previous procedure after the talks (Liberty and Zimmerman 1986: 695).   14
Thus, we focus on the second mechanism and study accounting accruals and cash flow 
behavior.
3  
Accounting accruals adjustments reflect business transactions that affect future 
cash flows (for which cash has not yet changed hands). Under generally accepted 
accounting principles, firms have discretion to recognize these transactions so that 
reported earnings reflect the true underlying business condition of the firm. However, 
managerial flexibility in calculating these accruals opens up opportunities for 
opportunistic earnings management. Extant research calculates abnormal accruals using 
the Jones (1991) model in cross-section, to improve the estimation of the parameters, as 
suggested by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). The Jones model uses the unexplained part 
of a regression of total accruals on the change in revenue and gross property, plant and 
equipment as a proxy for abnormal accruals. We deviate from the basic Jones model for 
two reasons. First, we focus on analyzing working-capital accruals because current 
research indicates that management has the most discretion over current accruals, and 
that manipulation of long-term accruals such as depreciation, is unlikely due to their 
high visibility and low flexibility (Becker et al. 1998, Young 1999). Second, we employ 
the Kasznik (1999) model, which differs from the standard Jones model in that it 
incorporates the change in operating cash flow as an explanatory variable to take into 
account the negative correlation between accruals and cash flow from operations 
(Dechow 1994). To check the robustness of the findings, we also use the Jones (1991) 
and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995).  
To obtain a measure of abnormal working capital accruals for all firms in 
industry j for year t, we estimate the Kasznik model in cross-section for all industry-
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where, WCA is working capital accruals, ΔREV is change in sales, ΔCFO is change in 
cash flow from operations and TA are total assets, and t is the time-period indicator. 
Next, for each firm, we calculate abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) as: 
                                                 
3 Most of the previous evidence on the effect of labour agreements on earnings management focuses on 
the first mechanisms.   15
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where,  0 ˆ α ,  1 ˆ α  and  3 ˆ α  are the fitted industry-coefficients from equation (2) and ΔREC is 
the change in accounts receivable. To run models (2) and (3) all available observations 
are used, including firms that sign a collective agreement, to avoid introducing biases in 
the analysis.
4 
To obtain abnormal accruals measures using the modified Jones model, we use 
the same procedure, but we do not include ΔCFO as an additional variable in models (2) 
and (3). Finally, to estimate abnormal accruals using the original Jones model, we 
follow this last procedure (i.e., exclude ΔCFO from the models), but without subtracting 
change in accounts receivable from change in sales in the second step and adding as an 
additional regressor PPE (gross property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total 
assets). Once we have obtained a measure of discretionary accruals, we study the 
association between collective agreement negotiation and earnings quality as follows: 
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,                    (4) 
where Event takes the value of 1 if the firm signs a collective agreement during the year, 
0 otherwise. We include in model (4) a set of variables that may influence the size and 
sign of accruals but that are not expected to be related to the event, as well as other 
variables that are potentially related to managerial strategic timing of collective 
bargaining and that were previously described in section 3.1 above. MKTB is the 
market-to-book ratio calculated as the ratio of year-end market value of equity to the 
year-end book value of shareholder’s equity. The greater MKTB is, the greater the 
investment opportunities available to the firm. Firms that operate in high MKTB 
industries are expected to have a greater proportion of highly qualified (and difficult to 
replace) workers, and be more likely to take measures in an attempt to retain their 
employees.  CFO is cash flow from operations divided by beginning-of-period total 
assets. IssDEBT (IssEQ) is an indicator variable of whether the firm issued debt (equity) 
in the year, to proxy for debt (equity) issuances, we create a dummy variable that takes 
                                                 
4 The estimation is made based on a set of over 35,000 firm-year observations for the considered sample 
period.   16
the value of 1 if there is an increase of over 10 per cent in the value of outstanding debt 
(equity capital), 0 otherwise. All other variables as measured as before. 
When running model (4), we are interested in studying the evolution of 
accounting quality surrounding the event, thus, we run the model from year t-1 to t+1, 
where t is the event year. If firms artificially depress earnings, we expect that β1 will be 
negative when we run model (4) in t and t-1, and positive in year t+1, indicating that 
firms that sign a collective agreement in year t depress earnings, and there is a reversal 
of previously negative accruals after the event. 
As an additional analysis, and given the evidence in Klasa et al. (2009) of 
strategic cash holdings, we also look at abnormal cash flow behavior. Earnings are the 
sum of cash flows and accounting accruals, thus, to manage earnings, it is conceivable 
that both components could be manipulated. In fact, the recent survey conducted by 
Graham et al. (2005) suggests that US-based CFOs and CEOs may in fact prefer to 
manipulate earnings through the use of real (vs. purely accounting) actions. We estimate 
abnormal cash flows (AbCFO) using the Roychodhury (2006) model. Similar to the 
calculation of abnormal accruals in equations (2) and (3), the first stage consists of 
deriving normal cash flow activity. We run the following cross-sectional regression for 
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where all variables are defined as before. For every observation, abnormal cash flow 
(ACFO) is obtained by subtracting from actual firm CFO the normal CFO calculated 
using the estimated  ˆ β  coefficients from equation (5). The procedure is the same as the 
one previously explained. 
3.2.2. Conditional conservatism tests 
Our proxy of conditional conservatism is based on Basu (1997). Under 
conservative accounting, earnings capture bad news faster than good news because of 
the asymmetric standards of verification for losses and gains. Basu uses stock returns to 
proxy for good and bad news. Stock prices incorporate all information arriving to the 
market from multiple sources, including reported earnings, in a timely fashion. 
Therefore, stock price changes are a measure of news arrival during the period. Because 
earnings are timelier in recognizing bad news than good news, Basu expects to find a   17
higher association of earnings with negative returns (the bad news proxy) than with 
positive returns (the good news proxy). We use Basu’s regression as follows: 
01 2 3 tt t t t t XD R D R β βββ μ =+ + + + ,          (6) 
where Xt is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, deflated by 
the firm’s market value of equity at the beginning of the period. Rt is the annual stock 
rate of return of the firm. Dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news 
(negative or zero rate of return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of 
return). The coefficient β3 measures the level of asymmetric timeliness —of conditional 
conservatism— and it is expected to be positive and significant. The greater β3 is, the 
more conditionally conservative firms are. We augment the Basu model to incorporate 
the signature of a collective agreement as follows: 
00 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
33 1  
tt t t t t t
tt tt t t t
X Event D D Event R R Event
DR DRE v e n t Y r
β ββ β β β
ββ ψ μ
=+ + + + +
++ ++ ∑
        (7) 
where Event is our indicator that the firm has signed a collective agreement during the 
year, and all other variables are defined as before. We run model (7) separately for years 
t-1 to t+1. If firms reduce earnings in response to bad news existing about the firm 
around the signature of a collective agreement, we expect that they will be more 
conditionally conservative than their counterparts in t-1 and t. Then, once previous 
accounting unravels after the event, these firms may appear to be less conservative in 
t+1. These effects are captured by the β21 and β31 coefficients in model (7), the main 
coefficients of interest.  
3.2.3. Alternative test of conditional conservatism 
Because of concerns with the reliability of the Basu (1997) measure (Dietricht et 
al. 2007), as a robustness check, we rerun our analysis using an alternative measure of 
conditional conservatism. In particular, we use the measure from Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), which does not require market values to estimate good and bad news. These 
authors develop a model to measure timely incorporation of gains and losses in 
accounting income ‘as the tendency for increases and decreases in earnings to reverse’ 
(p. 92). We estimate their model for our sample: 
01 12 13 1 1 * tt t t t t NI DNI NI DNI NI φ φφφ ε −−− − Δ = + + Δ+ Δ+ ,          (8)   18
where ΔNIt  (ΔNIt-1) is change in net income from fiscal year t-1 to t (t-2 to t-1), scaled 
by beginning-of-period total assets. DNI is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the prior-year change in net income is negative; 0 otherwise.  
As described by Ball and Shivakumar (2005: 92), ‘if gains are recognized in an 
untimely (smoothed) manner, they will be persistent components of net income that 
tend not to reverse and thus, φ2 will be equal to zero’. That is, under conservative 
accounting, they expect φ2 = 0. If managers choose aggressive accounting methods and 
foster good news recognition, positive income changes will behave as ‘temporary 
earnings components that tend to reverse’. Regarding economic losses, their timely 
recognition implies that ‘they are recognized as transitory income decreases, and hence 
reverse’ (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005: 92). As they show, the implication is that φ3 will 
be negative. Hence, the more negative φ3 is, the more temporary bad news are, 
indicating increased conditional conservatism.  
To summarize, we expect to observe an association between labor negotiations 
and low corporate earnings, to reduce the concessions made to employees in the 
bargaining process. Our first set of tests looks at the timing of the bargaining decision. It 
is predicted that managers will negotiate when earnings are low. However, these low 
earnings could be the product of accounting choice. In our second set of tests, we 
analyze whether this is the case. We try to understand if managers artificially depress 
earnings at the onset of negotiations, or if they prefer to simply time the negotiation 
when earnings are low (for economic reasons). To disentangle these effects, we 
separately study the possibility that earnings are low for opportunistic (earnings 
management tests) vs. informative (conditional conservatism tests) reasons. Managers 
can make income-decreasing accounting choices around contract negotiations that need 
not be opportunistic in nature. They can be related to economic shocks to the firm that 
are relevant for the contract negotiation and serve to inform the expectations of 
employees of firm growth, performance and viability. 
3.3.   Sample and data 
We identify firms quoted on the New York Stock Market that negotiate a firm 
level collective agreement between 1995 and 2007. These agreements are voluntary and 
their periodicity in the sample varies from 3 to 7 years. The information regarding 
contract negotiations was drawn from the Office of Labor-Management Standards. First, 
we collect information on US firms with firm level collective agreements from the 
Office of Labor-Management Standards from the US Department of Labor. We identify   19
120 listed firms that negotiate a firm-level labour agreement during the period 1995-
2007. To ensure the validity of the information we analyze the full text of each 
agreement. To be included in the sample labour contracts identified in the register must 
meet the following criteria: (1) the company’s annual earnings data is available for the 
year before the negotiation takes place (t-1) , negotiation year (t) and the following year 
(t+1); (2) the company has no merger processes, splits or any other relevant issue on the 
event year; and (3) the company does not belong to the financial and insurance sectors. 
In total, we identify 75 firms that meet the data requirements. For each of these 
firms, we identify a matching firm (that did not sign a collective agreement in the same 
year) by industry, size and number of employees. These matching firms may not sign 
any collective agreements during the sample period. Accounting and market data 
necessary to run the tests are downloaded from the Extel Financials database, which 
also contains data on firm CEO, President and chairman of the board. We only retain 
firms that have full data available to run the tests. This leads to a final sample of 150 
firms (75 pairs). Panels A and B of Table 1 show the distribution of the event sample 
among the different industries and years. From Panel A we can observe that nearly 50% 
of the observations belong to five industries (Automobile and parts, Electricity, 
Electronic & Electrical, Food producers and Telecommunication services). On average 
over the sample period, each year 5 collective agreements are signed annually, with a 
minimum of 1 agreement signed in 1996, and a maximum of 15 in 2003. Most firms 
classified as ‘event’ firms sign either 1 or 2 agreements during the period. One sample 
firm signed 5 agreements in the 16 year-period spanning the sample period.  
The reported industry concentration is in line with the information provided by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the US (2009). According to the Bureau of Labor, in 
the US there are wide differences in the rate of unionizing by industry. The percentage 
of union affiliation is generally higher in the public sector. Within the private sector, 
affiliation rates in 2007 (the last year of our sample data) ranged from 41.5% in 
‘Education, training and library occupations’ or 37,2% in ‘Protective services’ to just 
2.4% in ‘Financial activities’. As shown in Appendix, there is a positive association 
between increases in weekly wages and the rate of unionizing (i.e., percentage of all 
workers who are members of a labor unions or a employee association similar to a 
union as well as workers who report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered by 
a union or an employee association contract). 
On average, in 2007, unionized workers earned each week 131$ more than non-
unionized workers (22% increase in wages. From these statistics, it is clear that there is    20
Table 1. 
Sample composition by industry and year 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 
1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which negotiate a firm-level collective agreement 
during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event 
firm by 2 digit industry SIC code and total assets (size). 
Panel A: Industry composition 
 





Aerospace&Defence 83  6.35  83 6.35 
Automobiles&Parts 171  13.08  254 19.43 
Chemicals 54  4.13  308 23.57 
Construction&Building Mats.  29  2.22  337 25.78 
Diversified Industrials  20  1.53  357 27.31 
Electricity 159  12.17  516 39.48 
Electronic&Electrical 135  10.33  651 49.81 
Engineering&Machinery 93  7.12  744 56.92 
Food Producers&Tobacco  78  5.97  822 62.89 
Food&Drug Retailers  38  2.91  860 65.80 
Gas Distribution  50  3.83  910 69.63 
General Retailers  86  6.58  996 76.21 
Household Goods&Textiles  37  2.83  1033 79.04 
Leisure&Entertainment&Hotel 54  4.13  1087 83.17 
Media&Photography 41  3.14  1128 86.30 
Oil&Gas 29  2.22  1157 88.52 
Packaging 32  2.45  1189 90.97 
Steel&Other Metals  23  1.76  1212 92.73 
Telecommunication Services  95  7.27  1307 100.00 
 
Panel B: Year composition 
 
 





1993 37  2.83  37  2.83 
1994 46  3.52  83  6.35 
1995 42  3.21  125  9.56 
1996 67  5.13  192  14.69 
1997 81  6.20  273  20.89 
1998 88  6.73  361  27.62 
1999 92  7.04  453  34.66 
2000 90  6.89  543  41.55 
2001 98  7.50  641  49.04 
2002 101  7.73  742  56.77 
2003 101  7.73  843  64.50 
2004 98  7.50  941  72.00 
2005 98  7.50  1039  79.50 
2006 95  7.27  1134  86.76 
2007 90  6.89  1224  93.65 
2008 83  6.35  1307  100.00   21
a positive relation between percentage of workers unionized in a given industry and 
weekly wages, as expected. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the percentage 
of unionizing and the increase in weekly wages is of 0.38. From this data however, it is 
difficult to tell if workers join unions because of the higher salaries available to those 
who are unionized, or alternatively, if unions that represent a larger proportion of 
workers are capable of obtaining greater concessions (and wages) in dealings with 
management. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide sample descriptive evidence and Pearson correlation 
coefficients amongst the variables, respectively. The descriptive evidence is consistent 
with prior research. In particular, it can be observed that discretionary accruals and cash 
flows are on average close to zero. This is as expected, since these abnormal accruals 
and cash flows are the residual term from running models (2), (3) and (5) for the full 
sample of firms with valid data available (between 35,000 and 40,000 firm-year 
observations, depending on the model).  
Table 2 Panel B reports descriptive statistics of main variables of interest 
segregated by the occurrence of labor negotiations (Event=1) or not (Event=0). 
Untabulated results from a Wilcoxon test of medians suggest that total accruals are 
significantly more negative (Z-stat = -2.01, p-val = 0.02 for TACC and Z-stat = -1.51, p-
val = 0.06 for WAC) for the event subset, confirming that these firms show signs of 
income-decreasing accounting choices. A t-test of differences in means confirms that 
total accruals are significantly lower for the event sample (t-test = 1.98, p-val = 0.04). 
Further analysis of the descriptive evidence reveals that although discretionary accruals 
and cash flows are generally also lower for the event subset, these differences are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, the difference in total and working 
capital accruals between event and non-event firms appears not to be driven by the 
unexpected component of accruals.  
Looking at the control variables, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 
Panel B confirm that event firms are well-matched to non-event firms along a 
significant number of the control variables. Event firms are slightly larger than non-
event firms when the full sample is analyzed, with a mean (median) size of 16.43 
(16.59) for event firms, and an average SIZE of 16.07 (16.07) for non-event firms. This 
is consistent with firms subject to collective bargaining being more visible, large firms. 
As expected. However, this evidence confirms that it is important to control for SIZE in 
all of our regression tests.  
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Table 2.  
Descriptive statistics of sample variables 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 
1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which negotiate a firm-level collective agreement 
during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event 
firm by 2 digit industry SIC code and total assets (size). TACC is total accruals. WAC is working capital 
accruals. ATACC is discretionary total accruals as calculated by the Jones (1991) model. AWAC1 
(AWAC2) is discretionary working capital accruals as calculated by the modified Jones (Kasznik 1999) 
model. AbCFO is abnormal cash flow from operations as calculated by the Roychowdhury (2006) model. 
CFO is cash flow from operations deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. REV is total sales deflated 
by beginning-of-period total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total debt divided 
by total assets. ROA is return-on-assets. EMP is the natural logarithm of total employees. MKTB is the 
market-to-book ratio. IssDEBT (IssEQ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if total debt 
(number of shares) changes by more than 10% from the previous year. Cash is cash deflated by 
beginning-of-period total assets. NearCash is cash and short term investments deflated by beginning-of-
period total assets. DivPayout is the dividend payout ratio. AssetDisp is the net benefits from asset 
disposals deflated by beginning-of-period total assets.   
 
Panel A: Descriptive evidence 
 
Variable N Mean  Min Q1 Median Std.  Q3  Max
Earnings quality variables     
TACC  1307 -0.05 -0.25 -5.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.03  0.13
WAC  1307 0.00 -0.20 -0.08 0.00 0.07  0.02  0.20
ATACC  1307 0.04 -0.27 -0.03 0.01 0.52  0.05  0.89
AWAC1  1307 0.01 -0.39 -0.02 0.01 0.19  0.04  0.32
AWAC2  1307 0.01 -0.25 -0.02 0.01 0.12  0.03  0.23
AbCFO  1307 0.02 -0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.06  0.05  0.17
Control variables    
CFO  1307 0.01 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.05  0.03  0.15
REV  1307 1.08 0.19 -0.01 0.95 0.71 1.35 3.42
SIZE  1307 16.09 12.83 0.59 16.08 1.46 17.05 19.73
LEV  1307 4.42 0.01 15.07 0.46 67.32 0.88  17.09
ROA  1307 0.03 -0.23 0.21 0.04 0.12  0.07  0.18
EMP  1307 10.19 6.48 0.02 10.15 1.51  11.39  12.87
MKTB  1307 3.01 -7.53 9.23 2.11 10.08  3.36 22.25
IssDEBT  1307 0.34 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.47 1.00 1.00
IssEQ  1307 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Cash  1307 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.24
Loss  1307 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Perform  1307 0.53 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 1.00 1.00
Leader  1307 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.00 1.00
DivPayout  1307 0.26 -3.36 0.00 0.25 1.17  0.51  2.59
AssetDisp  1307 -0.19 -5.01 0.00 0.00 1.29  0.00  0.64
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Table 2 (Cont.) Descriptive statistics of sample variables 
 
Panel B: Descriptive evidence by subsets 
 
 Event=1  Event=0 
Variable  N Mean Median Std. N Mean Median  Std.
Earnings quality variables     
TACC  75 -0.07 -0.06 0.09 1232 -0.05 -0.05  0.07
WAC  75 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 1232 0.00  0.00  0.07
ATACC  75 0.02 0.01 0.21 1232 0.04 0.01 0.53
AWAC1  75 -0.01 0.00 0.16 1232 0.01 0.01 0.19
AWAC2  75 0.00 0.00 0.09 1232 0.01 0.01 0.13
AbCFO  75 0.02 0.02 0.08 1232 0.02 0.02 0.06
Control variables    
CFO  75 0.01 0.01 0.05 1232 0.01 0.01 0.06
REV  75 1.07 0.94 0.67 1232 1.28 0.99 1.06
SIZE  75 16.07 16.07 1.46 1232 16.45 16.59  1.35
LEV  75 4.64 0.46 69.32 1232 0.91 0.50 1.51
ROA  75 0.04 0.04 0.08 1232 -0.01 0.04 0.34
EMP  75 10.16 10.12 1.51 1232 10.72 11.02  1.31
MKTB  75 3.02 2.09 10.22 1232 2.87 2.87 7.31
IssDEBT  75 0.34 0.00 0.47 1232 0.25 0.00 0.44
IssEQ  75 0.17 0.00 0.37 1232 0.16 0.00 0.37
Cash  75 0.04 0.02 0.05 1232 0.04 0.02 0.05
Loss  75 0.16 0.00 0.36 1232 0.20 0.00 0.40
Perform  75 0.67 1.00 0.47 1232 0.63 1.00 0.49
Leader  75 0.27 0.00 0.44 1232 0.31 0.00 0.46
DivPayout  75 0.25 0.25 1.19 1232 0.28 0.25 0.61
AssetDisp  75 -0.19 0.00 1.32 1232 -0.10 0.00 0.61
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Table 3. 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which 
negotiate a firm-level collective agreement during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event firm by 2 digit 
industry SIC code and total assets (size). ATACC is discretionary total accruals as calculated by the Jones (1991) model. AWAC1 (AWAC2) is discretionary working 
capital accruals as calculated by the modified Jones (Kasznik 1999) model. AbCFO is abnormal cash flow from operations as calculated by the Roychowdhury (2006) 
model. CFO is cash flow from operations deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. REV is total sales deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. ROA is return-on-assets. EMP is the natural logarithm of total employees. MKTB is the 
market-to-book ratio. IssDEBT (IssEQ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if total debt (number of shares) changes by more than 10% from the previous 
year. Cash is cash deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. NearCash is cash and short term investments deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. DivPayout is 
the dividend payout ratio. AssetDisp is the net benefits from asset disposals deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. 
 
  ATACCAWAC1AWAC2 AbCFO CFO REV SIZE LEV ROA EMP MKTB IssDebt IssEQ Cash Loss PERF Leader DivPay
ATACC                   
AWAC1  0 . 2 2                 
AWAC2  0.16 0.25                
AbCFO  -0.07 -0.05 - 0 . 0 2               
CFO  -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 0.46              
REV  0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.23 0.09             
SIZE  -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.25            
LEV  0.00 0.06 0.16 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.01           
ROA  0.01 0.13 0.28 0.16 0.14 0.14 -0.01 0.10          
EMP  0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.23 0.72 0.00 0.03         
MKTB  0.00 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.02        
IssDebt  -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01       
IssEQ  0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.16      
Cash  0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.01     
Loss  0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 -0.46 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.13    
PERF  -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.11 -0.08 0.30 0.07 0.02 0.15 -0.01 -0.19 -0.62   
Leader  0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.12 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.00 -0.06 0.04  
DivPay  0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.15 0.36 -0.01 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.00
AssetD  -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01  25
4.   Results 
Table 4 presents results of running model (1) first for the full sample, and then, 
for a restricted sample of 897 firm-year observations where we only consider years t-4 
to t+1
5.
1 If managers time their decision to negotiate with workers to reduce the share of 
employees in firm rents, it is expected that they will bargain in periods with low ROA 
and Cash, and will be less likely to negotiate after periods of great growth (Perform=1), 
to minimize payments to employees. The evidence presented in Table 4 confirms the 
predictions with regards to ROA and Cash. In particular, ROA and Cash are 
significantly negative across all model specifications. 
On the contrary, managers may be obliged to negotiate when the employee base 
is greater, or they hold a position of leadership in their industry (visibility is high). In 
agreement with this view, Nemp and Leader are significantly positive across all model 
specifications, confirming that employee power is positively associated to collective 
agreement signature. The evidence also confirms that greater leverage is associated to 
lower incidence of collective agreement negotiations. LEV is negative across all model 
specifications and is significantly negative for the restricted sample tests. 
A slightly surprising result is the negative coefficient on SIZE. Clearly, SIZE and 
Nemp are relatively sticky variables that change slowly over time, and as shown in 
Table 3, there is a large significant correlation between them. As a robustness check, we 
recalculate SIZE by creating a size variable orthogonal to Nemp. To do so, we regress 
SIZE on Nemp in a first stage, and then, we repeat the analysis in Table 4 replacing 
SIZE by this new measure of size that is orthogonal to the employee base. The results 
are qualitatively the same, with the exception of Perform, which becomes significantly 
negative in this model estimation. This negative and significant coefficient on Perform 
is as predicted: if managers are able to strategically time negotiations, they will prefer to 
bargain with workers in periods when visibility is low (Perform is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has had positive increases in earnings in the past two 
years, 0 otherwise). 
Regarding abnormal accruals and cash flows around labor negotiations, Figure 1 
Panels A to D provides a graphical view of evolution of these figures (ATACC, AWAC1,  
 
                                                 
5 Commonly, studies analysing financial health show that the properties of accounting numbers start to 
differ from five years prior to the event (Beaver 1966).   26
Table 4.  
Timing of labour negotiations 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 
1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which negotiate a firm-level collective agreement 
during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event 
firm by 2 digit industry SIC code and total assets (size). The model is estimated using survival (event 
history model) analysis. CEO (PRESIDENT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO 
(President) is the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return-on-assets. EMP is the natural logarithm of total 
employees. MKTB is the market-to-book ratio. Leader is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
annual change in sales is above the industry median, 0 otherwise. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm reports a loss in the period, 0 otherwise. Cash is cash and cash equivalents divided 
by beginning-of-period total assets. Perform takes the value of 1 if the firm reported an increase in 
earnings in the last two periods, 0 otherwise. 
 
Full Sample  Restricted sample 
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
chi-sq chi-sq chi-sq chi-sq chi-sq chi-sq
CEO  0.089 0.054  
0.13  0.81  
PRESIDENT   0.249 0.226 0.291 0.304
 1.07 0.66 1.74 1.40
LEV  -0.072 -0.076 -0.071 -0.094 -0.091 -0.082
1.15 1.11 0.92 2.24 2.00 1.42
SIZE  -0.199 -0.214 -0.410 -0.261 -0.287 -0.280
3.17 3.57 5.98 5.10 6.02 3.36
ROA  -1.166 -1.198 -1.102 -1.012 -1.055 -1.084
8.93 9.39 6.50 6.89 7.48 6.65
EMP  0.436 0.463 0.727 0.510 0.539 0.566
15.26 17.61 15.30 21.18 23.91 11.96
MKTB  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.07
Leader  0.367 0.361 0.473 0.482 0.486 0.590
2.05 1.99 3.18 4.33 4.38 5.67
Loss  0.316 0.323 0.325 0.434 0.437 0.373
0.35 0.36 0.37 0.81 0.82 0.59
Cash  -5.899 -5.887 -6.736 -6.311 -6.557 -5.496
4.24 4.15 4.89 5.37 5.86 3.70
Perform  -0.093 -0.085 -0.167 0.113 0.139  0.198
0.84 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.19
  
Industry dummies  Included  Included
  
N 1307  1307 1307 897 897  897
Pseudos R-sq  0.06  0.06 0.07 0.11 0.12  0.15
Chi-sq 31.529  32.45 40.25 42.97 44.62  56.70
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Figure 1.  Evolution of accounting measures around labour negotiation 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 
1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which negotiate a firm-level collective agreement 
during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event 
firm by 2 digit industry SIC code and total assets (size). ATACC is discretionary total accruals as 
calculated by the Jones (1991) model. AWAC1 (AWAC2) is discretionary working capital accruals as 
calculated by the modified Jones (Kasznik 1999) model. AbCFO is abnormal cash flow from operations 
as calculated by the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Cash is cash deflated by beginning-of-period total 
assets. ROA is return on assets.   
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Figure 1 (Cont.) Evolution of accounting measures around labour 
negotiation 
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AWC2 and AbCFO), as well as of Cash and ROA. Panels A and B present evidence for 
the event firms, and Panels C and D for the non-event firms. Visually, the evidence in 
Panel A suggests a certain decline in abnormal accruals in year t. The evidence in Panel 
B suggests a moderate increase in ROA and Cash after year t, preceded, in the case of 
ROA by a prior decline from t-4 to t-1. The graphical representation of ATACC, AWAC1 
and AWAC2 is u-shaped in years t-1, t and t+1. This evidence could be consistent with a 
certain depression of earnings surrounding labor negotiations, in agreement with the 
income-decreasing hypothesis. It should be noted however, that this graphical regularity 
is not centered on t-1, but on t. This may be indicative of unions may use quarterly data 
or management forecasts of future performance to better estimate growth and 
performance over the collective agreement negotiation, leading to a depression of 
earnings in the same year of the negotiations. Alternatively, management may try to 
limit concessions to employees by providing more timely information on present and 
future economic losses. No discernible pattern can be observed with regards to AbCFO 
in Panel A, or in Panels C and D (the non-event subset). 
 
Table 5 presents results of running model (4) between t-1 and t+1. We use as 
dependent variables first the two abnormal working capital accruals measures (AWAC1 
and AWAC2) and then, the abnormal cash flow measure (AbCFO). All regressors are 
identical in the models with the exception of CFO and TACC, which are only used in 
the abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flows regressions, respectively. 
In model (4) the main coefficient of interest is Event, which takes the value of 1 
if the firm has a collective agreement negotiation. In the presence of income-decreasing 
earnings management, we should observe lower accruals prior to the negotiation (in t-1 
and t), and greater accruals after the negotiation (t+1). The evidence however does not 
support this hypothesis. We fail to find evidence of any significant pattern in the 
evolution of abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flows for the periods from t-1 to t+1. 
The results presented in Table 5 are generally consistent with prior work in the literature 
of earnings management, with respects to the sign and significance of the coefficients as 
well as to the goodness-of-fit of the model.  
Therefore, we fail to find evidence of income-decreasing opportunistic earnings 
management surrounding collective agreements negotiations, much like the prior 
literature. This failure to obtain evidence of downwards earnings management cannot be 
attributed to methodological concerns, as we follow the recent stream of literature in 
this area in calculating abnormal accrual behavior. The evidence in Table 4 is consistent    30
Table 5. 
 Accounting accruals and cash flows around labour negotiations 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 
1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which negotiate a firm-level collective agreement 
during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event 
firm by 2 digit industry SIC code and total assets (size). EVENT is a dummy variable that identifies if the 
firm has a collective agreement in time t, 0 otherwise. We model discretionary accruals and cash flows 
around time t (from t-1 to t+1). AWAC1 (AWAC2) is discretionary working capital accruals as calculated 
by the modified Jones (Kasznik 1999) model. AbCFO is abnormal cash flow from operations as 
calculated by the Roychowdhury (2006) model. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return-on-assets. MKTB is the market-to-book ratio. IssDEBT 
(IssEQ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if total debt (number of shares) changes by more 
than 10% from the previous year. CFO is cash flow from operations deflated by beginning-of-period total 
assets. TACC is total accruals deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. 
 













2  AbCFO 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
    (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) 
Intercept  -0.362 0.023  -0.133 0.035 -0.034 -0.131 -0.198 -0.048 -0.121
  (0.02) (0.31)  (<0.01) (0.41) (0.27) (0.02) (0.05) (0.27) (0.01)
EVENT  -0.017 0.008  -0.005 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001  -0.004
  (0.25) (0.15) (0.23) (0.35) (0.45) (0.41) (0.36) (0.47) (0.32)
SIZE  0.021 -0.002  0.006 -0.003 0.002 0.006 0.011  0.002  0.006
  (0.02) (0.25)  (<0.01) (0.33) (0.27) (0.07) (0.06) (0.31) (0.02)
MKTB  0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.001 0.001
  (<0.01) (0.21) (0.15) (0.21) (0.31) (0.32) (<0.01) (0.44) (0.24)
LEV  0.002 0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002  -0.001
  (0.43) (0.45) (0.40) (0.45) (0.24) (0.12) (0.27) (0.21) (0.45)
ROA  -0.232 0.323 0.507 0.168 0.176 0.191 0.465 0.659 0.502
  (0.12) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
IssDebt  -0.005 0.008  -0.003 -0.494 -0.091 0.015 -0.435 -0.307  0.016
  (0.43) (0.16) (0.30) (0.02) (0.17) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
IssEQ  0.065 -0.013 -0.011 0.021 0.001 0.009 -0.054 -0.047 -0.002
  (0.04) (0.12) (0.08) (0.22) (0.47) (0.25) (0.01)  (<0.01) (0.45)
CFO  -0.211 -0.286  . 0.036 -0.001 . -0.081  0.033  .
  (0.25) (<0.01)  . (0.12) (0.50) . (0.01)  (0.05)  .
TACC  . .  -0.684 . . -0.753 . .  -0.502
 .  .  (<0.01) . . (<0.01) .  .  (<0.01)
          
N  150 150 150 150 150 150 136 136 136
Adj-Rsq  0.19 0.19 0.45 0.12 0.39 0.27 0.42 0.44 0.40
 
with the overriding and time-continued income-increasing motivations dominating any 
incentives to manage earnings downwards during contract negotiations. These results 
indicate that likely, the institutional setting in the US creates more incentives for 
income-increasing than income-decreasing manipulation, even in periods of greater 
political and visibility costs, such as the ones analyzed in this study.   31
In our final set of tests, we analyze the evolution of conditional conservatism 
around labor negotiations. Table 6 Panel A presents the results obtained from running 
model (7) (the Basu model) separately for the periods t-1, t and t+1. We are interested in 
whether there is evidence of increased conditional conservatism before and during labor 
negotiations (in t-1 and t). If conditional conservatism increases, it would indicate that 
the observed association between lower earnings and labor negotiations is driven by 
economic events, i.e., managers recognize losses on a timely basis to increase the 
informativeness of earnings for collective bargaining with the employees. The results 
presented in Table 6 Panel A are consistent with this hypothesis. We observe increased 
conditional conservatism for the subset of event firms in both t-1 and t. Specifically, in 
period t-1, the main coefficient of interest (the bad news coefficient) is significantly 
positive for the event firms (β3+β31=0.201, p-val=<0.01), and greater than for the non-
event firms (β3=0.158, p-val=0.02). The same holds true for period t, where the bad 
news coefficient is also significantly positive for the event firms (β3+β31=0.808,  p-
val=0.01), and greater than for the non-event firms (β3=0.185,  p-val=0.15). This is 
consistent with increased conditional conservatism during firm-level contract labour 
negotiations. The results from the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model, presented in 
Panel B of Table 6, although slightly weaker, confirm that event firms are more 
conditionally conservative than non-event firms.
62 
4.1.   Sensitivity analyses 
  As previously mentioned, there is a well-developed literature that focuses on 
earnings management incentives. Most of this literature analyses situations where 
incentives exist for income-increasing manipulation. In particular, numerous studies 
focus on managerial efforts to meet or beat simple earnings targets, such as avoiding 
losses and earnings decreases (see, e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Degeorge et al. 
1999). There is ample evidence that managers are rewarded for meeting these simple 
targets (Barth et al. 1999, Skinner and Sloan 2002) even when there is evidence of 
accounting manipulation (Bartov et al. 2002). In this paper, we extend prior literature by 
studying an event that potentially generates incentives for income-decreasing 
accounting choice. Overall, we fail to find evidence of the existence of income-
decreasing abnormal accruals. One potential explanation for this lack of  evidence is 
that other income-increasing incentives that are stable over time, such as the incentive to  
                                                 
6 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) develop a second model based on the association between cash flows and 
accruals. However, in our setting, it is not feasible to implement their model due to data limitations, as 
there are very few firms with negative cash flows.   32
 
Table 6.  
Conditional conservatism around labour negotiations 
The sample comprises 1307 firm-year observations corresponding to 150 individual firms for the period 
1994-2008. Out of these firms, 75 are ‘event’ firms which negotiate a firm-level collective agreement 
during the sample period, and 75 are ‘non-event’ firms. The ‘non-event’ firms are matched to the event 
firm by 2 digit industry SIC code and total assets (size). EVENT is a dummy variable that identifies if the 
firm has a collective agreement in time t, 0 otherwise. We model discretionary accruals and cash flows 
around time t (from t-1 to t+1). Panel A presents results of running the Basu (1997) model. X is earnings 
before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of period market value. D is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm has a negative or zero annual return, 0 otherwise. R is the annual stock 
return. Panel B presents results of running the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model. CFO is cash flow from 
operations deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. TACC is total accruals deflated by beginning-of-
period total assets. DCFO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm cash flow from 
operations is negative, 0 otherwise. 
Panel A: Basu (1997) model (Dep. Variable = X) 
   t-1     t     t+1 
 Coeff.    Coeff.    Coeff. 
   (p-val)     (p-val)     (p-val) 
Intercept  0.065   0.048  0.034 
  (<0.01)  (0.12)  (0.01) 
D  -0.027  0.012  0.056 
  (0.13)   (0.44)  (0.04) 
Event  -0.029   -0.007  0.025 
  (0.06)   (0.45)  (0.16) 
D*Event  0.061   0.086    -0.088 
  (0.02)   (0.21)  (0.03) 
R  -0.084   -0.003  -0.004 
  (0.01)   (0.47)  (0.35) 
R*Event  0.067   0.004  0.003 
  (0.03)   (0.47)  (0.47) 
D*R  0.158   0.185  0.233 
  (0.02)   (0.15)    (<0.01) 
D*R*Event  0.043   0.623    -0.137 
  (0.29)   (0.01)  (0.10) 
        
R+R*Event               (β2 + β21) -0.017    0.001   -0.001 
  (0.23)   (0.49)  (0.49) 
D*R+D*R*Event     (β3 + β31)  0.201   0.808  0.096 
 (<0.01)    (<0.01)    (0.15) 
        
N  150   150  135 
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Table 6 (Cont.) Conditional conservatism around labour negotiations 
Panel B: Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model (Dep. Variable = TACC) 
   t-1     t     t+1 
  Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff. 
   (p-val)     (p-val)     (p-val) 
Intercept  0.001  -0.015  -0.007 
  (0.47)  -0.06    -0.37 
DNI  -0.012  0.002   -0.015 
  (0.18)  (0.45)  (0.37) 
Event  0.019  0.023  0.008 
  (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.40) 
DNI*Event  -0.012  -0.003  -0.122 
  (0.22)  (0.45)  (0.02) 
ΔNIt-1  0.111  0.782  -0.028 
  (0.30)  (0.01)  (0.49) 
ΔNIt-1*Event  -0.045  -0.606  -0.091 
  (0.47)  (0.06)  (0.43) 
DNI*ΔNIt-1  -0.516  -1.715   -0.99 
  (0.04)   (<0.01)   (0.08) 
DNI*ΔNIt-1*Event  -0.294  0.531   -4.511 
  (0.01)  (0.35)  (<0.01) 
       
ΔNIt-1+ΔNIt-1*Event  0.066  0.176  -0.119 
  (0.43)  (0.31)  (0.34) 
DNI*ΔNIt-1+DNI* ΔNIt-1*Event  -0.810  -1.184  -5.501 
 (0.02)    (<0.01)    (<0.01) 
          
N  150  150  136 
Adj-Rsq  0.16  0.24  0.83 
 
 
meet or beat targets dominates over the income-decreasing incentives. As a sensitivity 
check, we control in our discretionary accruals tests for the existence of such incentives. 
To do so, we follow Peasnell et al. (2005) and define two additional control variables 
Target1 and Target2. Target1 (Target2) takes the value of 1 if the firm reports positive 
earnings (earnings increases); 0 otherwise. Overall, these variables are positive as 
expected (albeit weakly significant in some models), consistent with income-increasing 
behavior in firms that meet or beat income targets. Their inclusion in the model 
however does not affect our main inferences and results. 
A potential concern of the results obtained regarding the timing of the 
agreements is that certain agreements may establish when the next agreement will take 
place, thus limiting the ability of management to time the signature. To control for this   34
potential problem, in our sensitivity analyses we include an additional variable (Repeat), 
that identifies firms that sign more than one agreement during the sample period. This 
variable turns out to be positive and significant, as expected, but its inclusion in the 
model does not affect the main results reported in Table 4.  
5.   Summary and conclusions 
We study accounting choice around firm-level collective agreement 
negotiations. In their seminal work, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that managers 
make income-decreasing accounting choices to reduce firm political costs and visibility 
and thus, limit the concessions made to trade unions during contract negotiations. 
However, the empirical research to date fails to find evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. We expect that this lack of evidence is driven by the confounding effects of 
(i) methodological concerns and (ii) influential institutional factors. Using a sample of 
US firms that engage in firm-level labor bargaining during the period 1994-2007, we 
study whether managers act strategically in an attempt to reduce the proportion of firm 
wealth that is accrued to employees. We use alternative methodologies to analyze 
income-decreasing accounting choices based on the developments of the discretionary 
accruals literature and the work on conditional conservatism. This choice permits 
disentangling whether any income-decreasing choices observed around labor 
negotiations are driven by opportunistic vs. informative motivations. 
The results provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that managers time their 
decision to negotiate with employees. In particular, we show that managers time the 
collective agreement negotiation when firm profitability and liquidity is low. This is 
consistent with the US evidence in Klasa et al. (2009) on the association between 
industry unionizing and cash holdings. Our evidence is also consistent with the relative 
strength of the different parties being important in determining when labor negotiations 
take place. Using an event history model, we show that collective agreement negotiation 
is positively related to the relative power of the employee base. 
In a second set of analyses we study whether the coincidence of low corporate 
income and collective agreement negotiations is driven by accounting choices, and 
whether these decisions can be interpreted as being opportunistic or as signaling 
information to the market on future and current growth, performance and firm viability. 
The results also provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that managers accelerate the 
recognition of losses and delay the recognition of gains in years surrounding collective 
bargaining. We do not find conclusive evidence of accounting accruals manipulation,   35
indicating that potentially, accounting choice around labor negotiation is informative of 
current economic conditions and not driven by managerial attempts to expropriate 
employees of their deserved share in the firms’ rents.  
From the results of this study we con conclude that in a context where the impact 
on the average increase of salaries as a consequence of a collective agreement is not 
high, the managers have not incentives to decrease earnings through manipulations of 
accruals. However, managers select opportunely the timing of the agreement and 
increase conditional conservatism around the time of the agreement. To affect the 
results of those agreements  
These results and conclusions have important implications for the understanding 
of the impact of institutional factors on earnings management and conditional 
conservatism , so on the quality of earnings. These results also give light on the 
comparability of financial information among different countries when there re 
institutional differences. More concretely, increase the knowledge about the behavior of 
managers in their relation with a specific political cost, the transfer of wealth to 
workers. 
Future research of this political cost and the incentives of managers  to 
manipulate earnings doing comparative studies among countries can  help to better 
understand the accounting differences among countries non attributable to differences in 
accounting standards.   36
Appendix. Unionizing in the US according to data from the Bureu of 
Labor Statistics 
     Weekly  Wages  Difference  in Wages   Percent
     Union  Non-Union  Total $  Percent    Union 
Management, professional and related  996  996  0  0%    14,9 
  Management, business & financial op  1066  1081  -15  -1%    6,0 
   Management  occupations  1172  1160  12  1%    5,4 
    Business and financial op  934  940  -6  -1%    7,2 
  Porfessional and related occupations  987  942  45  5%    20,5 
   Computer  and  mathematical  1188  1231  -43  -3%    5,8 
    Architecture and ingeneering  1179  1221  -42  -3%    8,7 
    Life, physical, and social sci  1147  1036  111  11%    10,9 
    Community and social services  920  732  188  26%    17,1 
   Legal  1180  1148  32  3%    6,4 
    Education, training and library  959  742  217  29%    41,5 
   Art, design, entertainment, sport, media  1000 807  193  24%   9,3 
    Healthcare practitioner & technical  1005  906  99  11%    15,1 
Service occupations  666  421  245  58%    12,4 
 Healthcare  support  502 446  56  13%    11,1 
 Protective  service  954 610  344  56%    37,2 
  Food preparation and serving  502  379  123  32%    4,9 
  Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance 551 407  144  35%    11,8 
 Personal  care  585 420  165  39%    8,6 
Sales and office occupations  717  587  130  22%    8,1 
 Sales  and  related  648 643  5  1%    3,7 
  Office and administrative support  726  560  166  30%    11,3 
Natural resources, construction and maintenance 973  617  356  58%    17,7 
  Construction and extraction  976  597  379  63%    19,2 
  Installation, maintenance and repair  975  709  266  38%    18,0 
Production, transportation and material moving   759  540  219  41%    16,8 
 Production  761 552  209  38%    14,8 
 Transportation  and  material  moving  757 523  234  45%    19,0 
Private sector  818  651  167  26%    8,2 
Non-agriculture related industries  819  654  165  25%    8,2 
 Mining  960 975  -15  -2%    10,2 
 Construction  1000  624  376  60%    14,4 
 Manufacturing  783 708  75  11%    12,0 
  Wholesale and retail trade  639  584  55  9%    5,7 
 Transportation  and  utilities  902 695  207  30%    23,4 
 Information  1000  867  133  15%    13,1 
 Financial  activities  729 784  -55  -7%    2,4 
  Professional and business services  800  782  18  2%    3,0 
  Education and health services  779  657  122  19%    10,0 
 Leisure  and  hospitality  580 431  149  35%    3,2 
 Other  services  822 593  229  39%    3,3 
Public sector  901  749  152  20%    39,8 
 Federal  927 996  -69  -7%    31,5 
 State    865 731  134  18%    34,0 
 Local  907 688  219  32%    45,6 
Average 867  736  131  22%    14,5   37
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